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I. INTRODUCTION
The passage of the Public Broadcasting Act of 19671 offered
the blueprint for the modern system of public broadcasting and
regulation and largely freed noncommercial broadcasting2 to be-
come a viable alternative to the commercial broadcasting" offered
1. 47 U.S.C. § 390 (1982).
2. For the purposes of this Article, "noncommercial broadcaster" is defined as a
television or radio licensee that does not receive paid advertising or operate for profit.
The term is interchangeable with "public broadcaster." For the statutory definition, see
id. § 397.
3. This Note defines "commercial broadcaster" as a television or radio licensee
that receives paid advertising and operates for a profit. The term is interchangeable
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by the three national networks. Since becoming intimately in-
volved in noncommercial broadcasting by providing partial fund-
ing, the federal government has imposed regulations on noncom-
mercial broadcasters far more rigid than the restrictions imposed
on commercial broadcasters. Recently, however, in a decision that
some might regard as heralding greater equality between the first
amendment rights of commercial and noncommercial broadcasters
and continuing the trend toward loosening restrictions on broad-
casters, the United States Supreme Court in FCC v. League of
Women Voters4 ruled that a ban on editorializing by noncommer-
cial broadcasters as prescribed in section 399 of the Public Broad-
casting Act of 1967' violated the first amendment rights of public
broadcasters.
Part II of this Note begins by discussing the Supreme Court's
traditional approach to regulations that limit broadcasters' first
amendment rights. Next, part III reviews the relevant history of
public broadcasting and the justifications for the Court's differen-
tial treatment of noncommercial broadcasters and commercial
broadcasters. Part III also examines efforts made to loosen regula-
tions imposed on noncommercial broadcasters, but focuses on sec-
tion 399's tight restrictions on broadcasters' freedom of speech. In
parts IV and V the Note raises the possibility that League of
Women Voters signals a new attitude of the Supreme Court to-
ward its traditional first amendment analysis of government regu-
lation of federally subsidized noncommercial broadcasters. Part VI
then focuses on the decision's present significance for noncommer-
cial broadcasters and their audience. In part VII, the Note exam-
with "private broadcaster."
4. 104 S. Ct. 3106 (1984).
5. 47 U.S.C. § 399 (1982) provides in relevant part: "No noncommercial educa-
tional broadcasting station which receives a grant from the Corporation [for Public
Broadcasting (CPB)] . . . may engage in editorializing. No noncommercial educational
broadcasting station may support or oppose any candidate for political office." Thus,
the editorial prohibition applies only to noncommercial broadcasters who receive CPB
grants, whereas the political endorsement prohibition applies to all noncommercial
broadcasters.
As originally enacted in 1967, 47 U.S.C. § 399 provided: "No noncommercial edu-
cational broadcasting station may engage in editorializing or may support or oppose
any candidate for political office." A new subsection designated as § 399(b) was added
to § 399 in 1973. The addition is not relevant to the instant litigation, but did require
Congress to redesignate the original § 399 as § 399(a). In 1981, Congress deleted the
new subsection and § 399(a) was again designated as § 399. Although the courts re-
ferred to the statute under scrutiny in the instant action as § 399(a) throughout much
of the litigation, this Note will refer to "§ 399" to avoid confusion.
6. 104 S. Ct. at 3127.
[Vol. 39:323
BROADCASTERS
ines two questions left unanswered by League of Women Voters:
whether editorializing may be defined as "lobbying activities" so
that noncommercial broadcasters lose their tax exempt status, and
whether the decision's analysis dictates that section 399's ban on
political endorsements is also unconstitutional. In response to the
first question, this Note calls for Congress and the Treasury to
provide guidelines for when, if ever, editorials could constitute lob-
bying activities. In answering the second question, the Note con-
cludes that despite the remote possibility of increased politiciza-
tion of public broadcasting the majority's opinion in League of
Women Voters makes inevitable the demise of section 399's ban on
political endorsements.7
II. TRADITIONAL JUDICIAL APPROACHES To ANALYZING
BROADCASTERS' FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
Broadcasting traditionally has received more limited first
amendment protection than other media. The United States Su-
preme Court early in the development of broadcasting established
the principle that the first amendment should be applied to broad-
cast media differently than to printed media. In National Broad-
casting Co. v. United States,5 the Court indicated that the unique
characteristics of broadcasting, most particularly the limited avail-
ability of spectrum space, made governmental regulation a neces-
sary impingement of the first amendment guarantee of free
speech.9 The Court also recognized that the licensing system that
Congress established in the Communications Act of 1934 was a
valid exercise of the commerce power and that the standard Con-
gress chose for granting broadcast licenses did not abridge or deny
free speech.'0
Later decisions have articulated the Supreme Court's reasons
for adhering to a policy of differentiating between broadcast and
other media. These decisions also have sought to justify the obvi-
ous discrepancies in the Court's treatment of broadcasting and
other media forms. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC1 the
7. In League of Women Voters, only that part of § 399 dealing with the ban on
editorializing was under consideration; the appellees did not challenge the constitution-
ality of the section's ban on political endorsements.
8. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
9. Id. at 226.
10. Id. Congress chose "the public interest, convenience, or necessity" standard
for the licensing of broadcasting stations. Id. at 226-27.
11. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). Red Lion Broadcasting carried a program that consti-
19861 325
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Court explained the principal ground for the distinction drawn in
the first amendment standards for broadcast media. The Court af-
firmed that "broadcasting is a medium affected by a First Amend-
ment interest," but reasoned that "differences in the characteris-
tics of new media justify differences in the First Amendment
standards applied to them."' 2 The Court, in explaining its decision
that broadcasting licensees' first amendment rights are subordinate
to the rights of viewers and listeners, observed that unless licensing
restrictions and a duty to conduct operations as proxies or fiducia-
ries of a community's trust with obligations to present representa-
tive views are imposed upon broadcasters the airwaves would be-
come overcrowded and virtually useless as channels for
communication.13 The notion that the limited number of available
radio frequencies justifies imposing duties on a broadcaster is
called the "spectrum scarcity doctrine."
Red Lion is of further interest because the Court affirmed the
validity of the Federal Communication Commission's (FCC) "fair-
ness doctrine."' 4 This doctrine had evolved over years of federal
regulation of broadcast media and had become a part of statutory
law.15 The fairness doctrine imposes on broadcasters two affirma-
tive duties: broadcasters' coverage of issues of public importance
must fairly reflect different viewpoints and must be sufficient to
inform the public.16 To effect these ends, the fairness doctrine re-
quires broadcasters to provide free time for the presentation of op-
posing viewpoints when paid sponsors are unavailable and requires
the broadcaster to initiate programming on public issues if no one
tuted a personal attack on an individual. The FCC ordered Red Lion to provide the
person with a transcript and reply time regardless of the person's ability to pay. The
Court held that the Federal Communication Commission's (FCC) actions did not ex-
ceed its authority and that the fairness doctrine's personal attack and political editorial
rules did not violate the first amendment.
12. Id. at 386 (citations omitted).
13. Id. at 388-89. "It does not violate the First Amendment to treat licensees
given the privilege of using scarce radio frequencies as proxies for the entire commu-
nity, obligated to give suitable time and attention to matters of great and public con-
cern. To condition the granting or renewal of licenses on a willingness to present repre-
sentative community views on controversial issues is consistent with the ends and
purposes of those constitutional provisions forbidding the abridgment of freedom of
speech and freedom of the press." Id. at 394.
14. Id. at 374-75.
15. The FCC first enunciated the "fairness doctrine" in In re Editorializing by
Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1257-58 (1949). The doctrine is codified at 47
U.S.C. § 315(a) (1982).




In Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic National
Committee's the Court affirmed the viability of the "scarcity doc-
trine," as a basis for distinguishing broadcast from other media.
The court stated that different first amendment values apply to
broadcast media because broadcasters use a finite resource. More-
over, the Court recognized the difficulty in balancing the first
amendment rights against the public interest. The Court noted
that the balancing process is confused by a regulatory scheme es-
tablished over a half century ago. Rapid technological changes fur-
ther complicate the balancing process because once-suitable solu-
tions become quickly outdated. 9
The Court held that Congress could not require broadcasters
to accept editorial advertising because "it would be anomalous for
us to hold, in the name of promoting constitutional guarantees of
free expression, that the day-to-day editorial decisions of broadcast
licensees are subject to the kind of restraints urged. . . .To do so
in the name of the First Amendment would be a contradiction
. . . .Application of such standards to broadcast licensees would
be antithetical to the very ideal of vigorous, challenging debate on
issues of public interest."20 Notwithstanding the rationale offered
for the Court's decision in CBS v. Democratic National Commit-
tee, the ban on editorializing by noncommercial broadcasters re-
mained intact until League of Women Voters.
In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation2 1 the Court added a new twist
to the first amendment analysis of broadcasters' rights. The Court
held that while the Communications Act expressly prohibits cen-
sorship of the media, the imposition of sanctions on the broadcast-
ing of obscene, indecent or profane language does not constitute
censorship.22 The Court in Pacifica offered two new justifications
17. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 393-96; see also S. HEAD & C. STERLING, infra note
26, at 475.
18. 412 U.S. 94 (1973); See also Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 396-401 for the clearest
articulation of the "scarcity doctrine." In Columbia Broadcasting a group of individu-
als filed a complaint with the FCC alleging that a broadcaster had violated their first
amendment rights by refusing to sell them time to broadcast announcements expres-
sing their views opposing the Vietnam War. The group alleged that the station's cover-
age of antiwar views did not meet the fairness doctrine's requirements. The Court held
that the "public interest" standard of the Communications Act of 1934 does not re-
quire broadcasters to accept editorial advertisements. 412 U.S. at 101-02.
19. 412 U.S. at 101-02.
20. Id. at 120-21.
21. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
22. Id. at 738.
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for distinguishing the rights of broadcasters from other speakers.
First, the Court reasoned that broadcast over the airwaves reaches
the individual, not only in public, but also in the privacy of the
home where one's right to be left alone clearly outweighs the first
amendment rights of the broadcaster.2 Second, the Court noted
that broadcasting, unlike other media, is uniquely accessible to
children, who should be protected from exposure to offensive
expression.2
Armed with well-established justifications for differentiating
between broadcasting and other forms of speech, the Supreme
Court in League of Women Voters nonetheless chose to reject the
arguments in favor of different first amendment rights for noncom-
mercial broadcasters. Whether the Court's rejection of its tradi-
tional approach to analyzing broadcasters' first amendment rights
in League of Women Voters signals a shift by the Court to in-
creased latitude for broadcasters to express freely controversial
ideas is discussed in part V of this Note.25
III. REGULATION OF PUBLIC BROADCASTING: AN HISTORICAL
OVERVIEW
A. Public Broadcasting: Evolution of the Statutory
Framework
Although federal involvement in noncommercial broadcasting
was not a new phenomenon, the year 1967 clearly marked the be-
ginning of a more precisely defined role for the federal government
in the funding of and active participation in the development of
public broadcasting. Early federal involvement came in the form of
regulatory efforts which focused on the licensing of noncommercial
radio and television. The federal government also made some at-
tempt to resuscitate the public broadcasting industry by reserving
spectrum space on FM, AM, and later, VHF and UHF frequencies
for the exclusive use of noncommercial broadcasters.2"
23. Id. at 748.
24. Id. at 749.
25. See infra notes 165-81 and accompanying text.
26. S. HEAD & C. STERLING, BROADCASTING IN AMERICA 384-85 (4th ed. 1982). In
1938, the FCC reserved 25 AM channels for the use of noncommercial broadcasters. In
1940, when FM allocations were made for the first time, the FCC reserved 5 of the 40
allocated FM channels for noncommercial broadcasters. According to Head and Ster-
ling, a crucial precedent had been set by reserving frequencies to broadcast noncom-
mercial educational programs. Id. at 255. Furthermore, when the FM band was reallo-
cated in 1945, the FCC reserved 21 out of 100 channels for educational broadcasting.
Id. The reservation of television channels for noncommercial broadcasters was a source
[Vol. 39:323
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Additional federal aid was slower in coming. Public broadcast-
ing was left entirely on its own to secure funds for operations until
1962 when Congress, for the first time, moved to directly appropri-
ate federal funds for the use of noncommercial educational broad-
casters. The Educational Television Facilities Act of 196228 pro-
vided for the distribution of thirty-two million dollars in federally
funded matching grants under the authority of the former Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare.2 9 The Act called for the
grants to be distributed over a period of five years in order to pro-
vide federal subsidies for the construction of noncommercial televi-
sion facilities. e
Until 1967, the Educational Television Facilities Act of 1962
grants constituted the extent of direct federal aid to public broad-
casters. In 1967, the Carnegie Corporation formed the first of its
special commissions composed of representatives from widely vary-
ing professions who were to examine the past and present state of
public broadcasting and develop means of obtaining increased fed-
eral funding.3 1 Carnegie I, as the Commission's report came to be
called, recognized that public broadcasting had failed to realize its
full potential because of insufficient financing, all of which came
from private donations, foundation grants, and state and local gov-
ernment appropriations.3 2 The Commission's report not only em-
phatically urged the federal government to come to the rescue of
public broadcasting, but also developed a "program for action"
that included legislative proposals which Congress implemented
without substantial change.33
of intense debate owing in part to the pressures from commercial broadcasting. The
FCC, however, in 1952 began reserving channel allotments for noncommercial televi-
sion broadcasters and the number of reserved allotments gradually rose to about 600.
Id. at 256, 258.
27. See Educational Television Facilities Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-447, 76 Stat.
64.
28. Id.
29. Id. at § 391.
30. Id. at § 390.
31. See generally CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION, PUBLIC
TELEVISION: A PROGRAM FOR ACTION (1967) [hereinafter cited as CARNEGIE I]. In 1979,
another commission, CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC BROADCASTING: A
PUBLIC TRUST (1979) [hereinafter cited as CARNEGIE II] supplemented the first Car-
negie Commission.
32. CARNEGIE I at 33-34, 36-37. The recommendations voiced in CARNEGIE I ad-
dressed the problems of "public television," but Congress later applied these recom-
mendations to noncommercial radio broadcasters as well. FCC v. League of Women
Voters, 104 S. Ct. at 3111 n.3.
33. Congress did not incorporate the Commission's proposals for long-term fund-
1986]
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The work of the first Carnegie Commission, which President
Lyndon Johnson endorsed, 4 led to Congress' passage of the Public
Broadcasting Act of 1967, 5 amending the Communications Act of
1934.6 As a declaration of policy, the Public Broadcasting Act
s 7
(the Act) stated that Congress could serve the public's interest
best by encouraging the growth and development of public radio
and television broadcasting.38 The Act emphasized that program-
ming diversity, which Congress viewed as furthering the general
welfare of the viewing public, depended upon "freedom, imagina-
tion, and initiative on both local and national levels. '39 Congress
also declared that public telecommunication services should be re-
sponsive to the interest of members of both the local and national
public.40 To ensure that public broadcasting remained free from
outside interference and control, Congress determined that a pri-
vate corporation should be created to bring about the development
of public broadcasting.
41
Soon after the Act became law, the nonpolitical corporation
that the Carnegie Commission envisioned came into existence pur-
suant to the guidelines set forth in the Act.4 2 Chief among the ac-
tivities of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB)4' was its
establishment of interconnection systems 44 for the distribution of
broadcast services, the development of diverse programming, and
ing and for giving the President the power to appoint members of the CPB. S. HEAD &
C. STERLING, supra note 26, at 259.
34. S. HEAD & C. STERLING, supra note 26, at 259.
35. 47 U.S.C. § 390 (1982).
36. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
37. See id. § 396(a), (g).
38. Id.
39. Id. § 396(a)(3).
40. Id. § 396(a)(5).
41. Id. § 396(a)(7). For a general discussion of the limitations on the exercise of
power by this private corporation, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, see infra,
note 129.
42. See generally, 47 U.S.C. § 396(b) (1982). Section 398 of the Act prohibits
federal interference with the CPB's activities.
43. Section 396(b) of the Act specifically states that Congress is to name the non-
profit corporation formed to facilitate the aims of the Act the Corporation for Public
Broadcasting. Section 396(g) sets forth the purposes and activities of the Corporation.
44. Interconnection means "the use of microwave equipment, boosters, transla-
tors, repeaters, communication space satellites, or other apparatus or equipment for
the transmission and distribution of television or radio programs to public telecommu-
nications entities." 47 U.S.C. § 397(3) (1982).
"Interconnection system" means any system of interconnection facilities used for
the distribution of programs to public telecommunications entities. Id. § 397(4) (1982).
[Vol. 39:323
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the distribution of federal funds."'
Later, the CPB established the Public Broadcasting Service
(PBS) to operate interconnection facilities.4" Following an in-
tensely rivalrous and prolonged struggle with CPB, PBS emerged
as a representative of station interests rather than CPB interests.
47
The battle between CPB and PBS underscored the sensitivity of
noncommercial broadcasting's competing interests and perhaps
provided an early signal of the conflicting attitudes towards non-
commercial broadcasting's purposes. Furthermore, the struggle be-
tween CPB and PBS "provide[d] only a hint of the repetitive and
stubborn nature of the continued arguments [that] centered on
programming and funding decisions '4 8 and which have provided
fuel for the arguments of regulatory zealots.
B. Public Broadcasting: The Stepchild of the Congress
and the FCC
From the time the federal government stepped into the fund-
ing scheme of public broadcasting, most debate has focused on the
need to insulate public broadcasters' programming decisions from
political pressures such as the threat of loss of funds.49 Even a cas-
ual survey of congressional and FCC measures aimed at "protect-
ing" public broadcasting from the threats of politicians, however,
reveals that the "protective" regulations imposed on public broad-
casters are far more restrictive than necessary. For example, the
Act sets forth the formula for the distribution of funds to licensees
and permittees of public television and radio50 rather than entrust-
ing the equitable distribution of funds to the judgment of the
45. Id. § 396(g).
46. S. HEAD & C. STERLING, supra note 26, at 260.
47. Id. at 261.
48. Id.
49. Fears of political pressure being exerted on noncommercial broadcasters have
not been completely unfounded. For example, incidents during Richard Nixon's presi-
dency illustrate the difficulty of insulating a broadcasting system from political pres-
sure when broadcasting depends on the federal government for substantial economic
support. S. HEAD & C. STERLING, supra note 26, at 275. Head and Sterling describe
incidents such as the administration's public attacks on noncommercial broadcasters
and President Nixon's veto of a bill "patiently nursed through Congress" that would
have provided two-year funding for public broadcasting as examples of political pres-
sures being exerted on public broadcasters. Id.
Commercial broadcasters are not free of political pressures either, as evidenced by
the attempt of conservative Senator Jesse Helms to take control. of the Columbia
Broadcasting System (CBS) by urging conservatives to buy stock in the network.
50. 47 U.S.C. § 396(k) (1982).
1986]
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nonpolitical CPB.51 Although the CPB is a nongovernmental entity
and Congress does have a legitimate interest in seeing that funds
are properly spent, critics of the distribution formula argue that
the formula coupled with the requirements of annual audits of the
CPB is little more than an attempt to ensure that the CPB re-
mains politically loyal to Congress.52 The Act also conditions re-
ceipt of federal funds upon station compliance with Congress' re-
quirement that each station establish a community advisory board,
the duties of which Congress has prescribed by statute. 3 In past
years Congress has strengthened rather than loosened the Act's
guidelines governing the formation of these advisory boards.5 Al-
though the Act provides that the community advisory boards shall
"have [no] authority to exercise any control over the daily manage-
ment or operation of the station,"55 the requirement that noncom-
mercial broadcasters must nonetheless defer to a largely symbolic
board underscores Congress' unwillingness to support complete
journalistic freedom for noncommercial broadcasters, possibly be-
cause of fears that Congress itself would be the subject of noncom-
mercial broadcasters' attacks.
Another restrictive regulation that applies only to noncom-
mercial broadcasters is the total ban on commercial advertising.
5 6
Congress, however, has indicated recently a willingness to recon-
sider its position on noncommercial broadcasters' acceptance of
paid advertisements. 57 The FCC has modified its fundraising poli-
51. See generally id. §§ 396(b), 398.
52. See, e.g., Note, Freeing Public Broadcasting from Unconstitutional Re-
straints, 89 YALE L.J. 719, 729 n.69 (1980). Annual audits of the CPB are mandated in
47 U.S.C. § 396(1) (1982).
53. See 47 U.S.C. § 396(k)(9)(A)-(E) (1982).
54. Initially, § 396 merely mandated that each station receiving grants establish a
community advisory board. As amended in 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35 § 1227(g), the stat-
ute now further intrudes on stations' discretionary decisions in establishing the board
by imposing upon the stations the duty to assure that board members regularly hold
and attend meetings. 47 U.S.C. § 396(k)(9)(A) (1982).
55. 47 U.S.C. § 396(k)(9)(C) (1982).
56. 47 C.F.R. § 73.621 (e) (1984). The provision states that "No promotional an-
nouncements on behalf of for profit entities shall be broadcast at any time in exchange
for the receipt, in whole or in part, of consideration to the licensee, its principals, or
employees. However, ackowledgements of contributions can be made." Id. (emphasis in
original).
57. Congress in 1981 authorized the newly created Temporary Commission on Al-
ternative Financing for Public Telecommunications to develop a "demonstration pro-
gram" regarding advertising. Act of Aug. 13, 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, tit. XII, subtit. B,
ch. 1, § 1233, 95 Stat. 357, 733. Congress authorized the CPB, in consultation with the
Temporary Commission, to select at most 10 public television and 10 public radio sta-
tions to participate in the program. To ensure uninterrupted programming, a hallmark
[Vol. 39:323
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cies for noncommercial broadcasters, which conceivably may allow
some form of paid advertisements.5" Congress also required public
broadcasters who received government funds to retain for sixty
days an audio recording of each broadcast in which the subject of
discussion touched on "any issue of public importalce."59 In 1978,
however, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia declared this requirement unconstitutional.
6 0
Although difficult to interpret, section 396(g)(1)(A) is another
example of a unique restriction that Congress has placed on public
broadcasters. Section 396(g)(1)(A) of the Act requires noncommer-
cial licensees to adhere strictly to "objectivity and balance in all
programs or series of programs of a controversial nature."6' 1 The
comparable provision 2 under the Communications Act of 1934,3
which applies to noncommercial and commercial broadcasters
alike, requires only that a licensee afford "reasonable opportunity
for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public impor-
tance. '84 The difference between the two requirements is not read-
ily apparent.8 5 Both CPB and PBS have argued that section
396(g)(1) (A) is merely a restatement of the fairness doctrine, which
applies to both commercial and noncommercial broadcasters.6 The
of public broadcasting, the Act allowed the selected stations to run advertisements at
the beginning or end of programs. If the program length exceeded two hours, the Act
allowed the station to run advertisements during a break scheduled for station identifi-
cation or at other times not unduly disruptive of the program. Id.
58. See In re Commission Policy Concerning the Noncommercial Nature of Edu-
cational Broadcasting, 97 F.C.C.2d 255 (1984) (noting liberalized Commission policies
on public broadcasters' fundraising activities by amending 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.503, 73.621
(1984)); In re Commission Policy Concerning the Noncommercial Nature of Educa-
tional Broadcast Stations, 90 F.C.C.2d 895 (1982); In re Commission Policy Concerning
the Noncommercial Nature of Educational Broadcast Stations, 86 F.C.C.2d 141 (1981)
(eliminating the blanket proscription against promotion of products and services and
instituting "consideration received" rule).
59. 47 U.S.C. § 399(b) (Supp. V 1975). Former § 399(b) of the Act required
broadcasters to make available upon request, for the reasonable cost of reproduction, a
copy of such recording to private individuals or the FCC. 47 U.S.C. § 399(b)(3)(A)-(B)
(deleted in 1981).
60. Community-Service Broadcasting of Mid-America, Inc. v. FCC, 593 F.2d 1102
(D.C. Cir. 1978).
61. 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(1)(A) (1982).
62. Id. § 315(a).
63. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
64. Id. § 315(a).
65. One writer has noted that "the only thing certain about the terms 'objectivity
and balance' is that they apply only to programs funded by the CPB." Branscomb, A
Crisis of Identity: Reflections on the Future of Public Broadcasting, in THE FUTURE OF
PUBLIC BROADCASTING 23-24 (D. Cater & M. Nyhan eds. 1976).
66. Id. at 23.
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discrepancies in the language of the two bills, however, have led
one commentator to conclude that "the requirements of Section
396(g)(1)(A) [are] far more stringent in terms of balancing views to
cover far more subject matter" than section 315(a) of the Commu-
nications Act of 1934.67
Another problem noncommercial broadcasters face in deter-
mining their obligations under section 396(g) (1) (A) is that of ascer-
taining the scope of the phrase "programs or series of programs" of
a controversial nature. This phrase could be interpreted to require
"'objectivity and balance' within a single program, in a single-title
series, in all programs involving the same issue, in all controversial
programming, or in an entire program package for a season. 6 8
Courts, however, have failed to provide licensees with guidelines
for these determinations.
In addition to the unique restrictions placed on noncommer-
cial broadcasters under section 396(g)(1)(A), noncommercial
broadcasters must also comply with regulations imposed generally
on all broadcasters. The FCC's fairness doctrine6 and the personal
attack and political editorial rules are two examples of generally
applicable broadcasting regulations. °
C. Loosening the Regulatory Stranglehold
Although the achievement of complete equality between regu-
lation of commercial and noncommercial broadcasters is unlikely
in the near future, developments in recent years have brought non-
commercial broadcasters greater freedom. Some of these develop-
ments are purely statutory; others are attributable to judicial ac-
tivism. These developments point the way toward increased
independence in noncommercial broadcasters' choice of broadcast
content, a trend the League of Women Voters decision indicates is
67. Id. at 24.
68. Id.
69. See Accuracy in Media, Inc. v. FCC, 521 F.2d 288, 296 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976). For a discussion of the fairness doctrine, see supra note 15
and accompanying text.
70. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), upheld the constitu-
tionality of § 315(a) of the Communications Act of 1934, which required licensees that
endorsed or opposed legally qualified candidates for public office in editorials to trans-
mit within 24 hours a copy of the broadcast to the candidate opposed. 47 C.F.R. §
73.1940 (1984). This regulation outlines further requirements that apply when a broad-
caster attacks a candidate within 72 hours of an election. In that instance, broadcasters
must notify the candidate sufficiently far in advance to allow him or her ample time to




One example of Congress' willingness to loosen the reins of
noncommercial broadcast regulation was the authorization in 1981
of an advertising "demonstration program"'1 as a means for evalu-
ating whether advertising by noncommercial broadcasters might
offer an attractive funding alternative. Although the demonstration
program stated strict guidelines for the content and timing of ad-
vertisements, 2 Congress' willingness, for the first time, to allow
noncommercial broadcasters to tap a new source for obtaining nec-
essary operating funds possibly portends the federal government's
decreased direct involvement in public broadcasting affairs.
73
Legislation that increased the license period from three years
to five years for television licensees and from three years to seven
years for radio licensees is a further statutory change that helps to
free noncommercial and commercial broadcasters from undue reg-
ulations.7' The longer renewal periods undoubtedly should afford
broadcasters two advantages. First, applicants for renewals will
have additional time to muster evidence establishing grounds justi-
fying license renewal. Second, applicants will probably not have to
appear before the FCC, which is largely a politically partisan
body, 7 5 as often as before.
Perhaps the most significant boost towards reduced interven-
tion in the affairs of noncommercial broadcasters came in the form
of a 1978 decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the
71. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
72. See supra note 57.
73. Allowing noncommercial broadcasters to accept some paid advertisements
could have both positive and negative results. If both types of broadcasters accept paid
advertisements, the line between what constitutes commercial and noncommercial
broadcasting inevitably will begin to blur. However, noncommercial broadcasters who
accept paid advertisements could reduce their reliance on governmental subsidies. Re-
duced reliance on federal subsidies would be of great benefit to noncommercial broad-
casters. The ever-present problem of inadequate funding has increased in magnitude in
recent years owing to substantial cutbacks in federal appropriations. For a broad over-
view of developments in funding for noncommercial broadcasters for fiscal years 1982-
1986, see 1981 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 16 (describing appropriations and funding cuts
with President's budget request) and at 554 ("CPB's advance funding, designed by
Congress to protect public broadcasting from political pressures and to help long-range
planning, was violated when Congress agreed to some of [President] Reagan's cuts in
funds already appropriated for fiscal 1983."). See also infra note 187 for a review of
appropriations for fiscal years 1976-1986.
74. Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 1241(a), 95 Stat. 736 (1981).
75. The FCC is composed of five commissioners appointed by the President for
terms of seven years. The number of members who may belong to the same political
party is limited to the number equal to the least number of commissioners constituting
a majority of the FCC's full membership. 47 U.S.C. § 154(a), (b)(5), (c) (1982).
336 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:323
District of Columbia Circuit, Community-Service Broadcasting of
Mid-America, Inc. v. FCC.76 The court held that section 399(b) of
the Public Broadcasting Act 77 and FCC regulations promulgated
thereunder were invalid because the regulations denied petitioners,
a number of noncommercial educational broadcasting stations, the
equal protection of the laws of the United States guaranteed by
the fifth amendment.7 8 Section 399(b) had required all noncom-
mercial stations that received any federal funding to record and
retain for sixty days all broadcasts "in which any issue of public
importance [was] discussed. '79 Chief Judge Wright, writing for the
majority, found strong support in the legislative history of section
399(b) for the view that the recording requirement's purpose was
related to suppressing free expression on issues of public impor-
tance8 0 Judge Wright suggested that the statute furthered an im-
permissible government purpose to restrict free speech on the basis
of its content. 1 He concluded that even if the statute's enactment
was within Congress' constitutional power, the statute did not
identify any important and substantial government interest that it
furthered, nor did the government show that section 399(b)'s inci-
dental restriction of first amendment freedoms was no greater than
necessary to further that interest.82 Although the constitutionality
of the ban on editorializing and political endorsements was not at
issue in Community-Service Broadcasting,"3 that decision may
76. 593 F.2d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
77. 47 U.S.C. § 399(b) (Supp. V 1975).
78. 593 F.2d at 1103.
79. 47 U.S.C. § 399(b) (Supp. V 1975).
80. 593 F.2d at 1112.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1114. The court applied the four criteria established in United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), for a constitutional analysis of the restraints on first
amendment freedoms. The O'Brien test provides that a statute which imposes at least
incidental restraints on first amendment freedoms can be upheld only: (1) if it is within
the constitutional power of the Government; (2) if it furthers an important or substan-
tial governmental interest; (3) if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppres-
sion of free expression; and (4) if the incidental restriction on alleged first amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. Id. at 377.
O'Brien was not a broadcast regulation case. O'Brien and three companions burned
their Selective Service registration cards on the steps of a Boston courthouse. The Su-
preme Court upheld O'Brien's conviction for violating a federal law prohibiting the
destruction or mutilation of Selective Service certificates. The Court found that the
federal statute on its face did not abridge first amendment freedom of speech rights.
83. 593 F.2d at 1108 n.11. Before the 1981 amendments, the ban on editorials and
political endorsements was contained in 47 U.S.C. § 399(a). Congress in 1981 deleted §
399(b) and redesignated § 399(a) as § 399, which is the statute involved in League of
Women Voters.
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have provided the impetus and guidelines for the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in League of Women Voters.
D. Section 399: A Stubborn Survivor
Despite the recent statutory changes and judicial decisions
that have gradually loosened the regulatory grip on noncommercial
broadcasters, section 399 remains the most outstanding example of
content restriction imposed upon public broadcasting licensees. A
brief examination of the legislative history of section 399 reveals
the reasons for its passage and offers an explanation for Congress'
retention of the section. The Senate version of the Public Broad-
casting Act did not contain the prohibition against noncommercial
broadcasters' editorializing. Rather, the House version added the
ban 84 "[olut of an abundance of caution."8 5 One commentator has
argued, however, that the legislative history of section 39986 reveals
that "the anti-editorializing provision was inserted as a 'carrot' for
recalcitrant congressmen, who felt they were very vulnerable to the
media and were unwilling to finance a potentially critical me-
dium. '87 The Senate managers achieved an impliedly narrowed
construction of the provision by agreeing to accept the provision
only if "the prohibition against editorializing was limited to pro-
viding that no noncommercial educational broadcast station
[could] broadcast editorials representing the opinion of the man-
agement of such station."88 Courts have adopted this interpreta-
tion of section 399.89 Thus, the ban only prevented editorializing
by management or by representatives of management on the be-
half of management.90
84. Lindsey, Public Broadcasting: Editorial Restraints and the First Amend-
ment, 28 FED. COM. B.J. 63, 79-80 (1975).
85. H.R. REP. No. 572, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 15, reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 1799, 1810.
86. See Hearings on H.R. 6736 and S. 1160 Before the House Comm. on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1967). An example of the strong
feelings concerning the practice of editorializing is found in a statement made by the
provision's most vocal advocate: "There are some of us who have very strong feelings
because they have been editorialized against." House Hearings at 641 (remarks of Rep.
Springer); see also 113 CONG. REC. 26,391 (1967) (remarks of Rep. Joelson).
87. Lindsey, supra note 84, at 81.
88. CONFERENCE REP. No. 794, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprinted in 1967 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1834, 1835 (emphasis added).
89. See Accuracy in Media, Inc., 45 F.C.C.2d 297, 302 (1973) (construing ban on
editorializing as being limited only to "licensees, their management or those speaking
on their behalf for the propagation of the licensees' own views on public issues"); see
also Walker & Salveter, 32 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 839, 846 (1975).
90. For a discussion of the tactics used by management to get around this ban on
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Section 399 survived two legislative attempts to repeal the
provision9' and incurred only minor changes in the 1981 amend-
ments to the Act. As amended,"2 the provision applied the editorial
ban to only noncommercial educational broadcasters that received
CPB grants. The amendments retained the complete ban on politi-
cal endorsements made by all noncommercial educational broad-
casters.93 Furthermore, Congress deleted subsection (b), which the
D.C. Circuit had held unconstitutional in an earlier case, and
redesignated the provision as section 399. The amended section
399 constituted the statute that the Supreme Court considered ul-
timately in League of Women Voters.95 Although commentators
had for years expressed doubts about section 399's constitutional-
ity,9 the statute did not attract the attention of any court until
1979 when FCC v. League of Women Voters was first brought.
IV. THE League of Women Voters DECISION
The appellees 7 in FCC v. League of Women Voters initially
challenged the constitutionality of former section 39998 in a suit
brought before the United States District Court for the Central
editorializing, see infra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
91. Legislation proposed by Senator William Proxmire, The First Amendment
Clarification Act of 1977, S. 22, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., and by Congressman Robert
Drinan, The First Amendment Implementation Act of 1975, H. 2189, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess., would have repealed § 399. Neither bill was enacted.
The house bill introduced in 1975 was reintroduced in the 95th Congress in modi-
fied form by Congressman Van Deerlin. The bill in its original form would have re-
pealed the prohibition of § 399 against editorials, but would have left intact the prohi-
bition against endorsing or opposing political candidates. Congress passed the bill
without repealing any of § 399. The Act is entitled the Public Telecommunications
Financing Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 2405, Pub. Law 95-567, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
92. Act of August 13, 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, tit. XII, subtit. B, ch. 1, § 1229, 95
Stat. 357, 730.
93. Id.
94. See supra notes 76-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of Community-
Service Broadcasting of Mid-America, Inc. v. FCC, 593 F.2d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
95. The plaintiffs in League of Women Voters had to amend the complaint nu-
merous times to reflect the statutory changes. See infra notes 97-104 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of the case's turbulent procedural history.
96. See, e.g., Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Implied Political Establish-
ment Clause, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1104 (1979); Note, The Public Broadcasting Act: The
Licensee Editorializing Ban and the First Amendment, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 541
(1980).
97. Appellees included the League of Women Voters of California, Pacifica Foun-
dation (a nonprofit corporation that owns and operates noncommercial broadcasting
stations), and Congressman Henry Waxman, a regular listener of noncommercial
broadcasting).
98. See supra note 5 for an explanation of the numerous revisions of § 399.
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District of California in April 1979.91 Shortly thereafter, the De-
partment of Justice under the Carter Administration determined
that it would not defend the statute's constitutionality. The De-
partment believed that section 399 violated the first amendment's
guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of the press by un-
duly restricting the ability of public broadcasters to engage in com-
mentary that reflected station management's views on matters of
public interest.100 The United States Senate responded by adopt-
ing a resolution ordering Senate counsel to intervene as amicus cu-
riae in support of section 399.101 The suit, however, was dismissed
subsequently for want of a justiciable controversy because the fed-
eral government refused to enforce the statute.
0 2
While the appellees' appeal from the earlier disposition was
pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, a change in presidents brought a change in the executive
branch's policy towards the statute. Following the Justice Depart-
ment's announcement under the Reagan Administration that it
would defend the statute, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to
the district court which, now that a concrete controversy existed,
allowed Senate counsel to withdraw and vacated the earlier order
of dismissal. In the interim, Congress amended section 399 to re-
strict the editorial ban to grant-receiving broadcasters while pre-
serving the blanket prohibition on the making of political endorse-
ments.10 3 Appellees accordingly amended their complaint in
response to the statutory changes. In an important alteration, the
appellees dropped the challenge to section 399's prohibition on po-
litical endorsements and focused entirely on the editorializing
prohibition.
10 4
Rejecting the government's contention that section 399's ban
on editorializing served a compelling government interest by
preventing noncommercial broadcasters from becoming "propa-
ganda organs for the government,"'1 5 the district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the appellees. 0 6 The district court
found that the protection of the FCC's fairness doctrine, the di-
99. 104 S. Ct. 3106, 3112-13 (1984).
100. Id. at 3113 & n.8 (quoting letter from Attorney General Benjamin R. Civi-
letti to Senate Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd (Oct. 11, 1979), app. 13-14).
101. S. Res. 328, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979).
102. League of Women Voters v. FCC, 489 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
103. Pub. L. No. 97-35, tit. XII, § 1229, 95 Stat. 730 (1981).
104. League of Women Voters v. FCC, 547 F. Supp. 379, 382 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
105. Id. at 386.
106. Id. at 387.
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verse funding sources available to noncommercial broadcasters,
and the Public Broadcasting Act's built-in safeguards outweighed
the fear of government control.1 07 As a result, section 399's restric-
tion on editorializing did not promote a governmental interest suf-
ficient to merit the impingement of first amendment freedoms
caused by the editorial ban. l08 The district court based its decision
entirely on first amendment grounds and specifically declined to
adopt plaintiff's equal protection argument. 0 9 The court did note
in dicta that plaintiff's equal protection claim might have had
merit if the appellees had presented more evidence.110
On direct appeal from the district court,"' the United States
Supreme Court affirmed the district court's holding. The Supreme
Court held that the government interest that section 399's editorial
ban sought to advance was neither sufficiently substantial nor suf-
ficiently limited to justify the ban's abridgement of the journalistic
freedoms protected by the first amendment.1 2 Although the Court
noted that the fundamental principles guiding evaluation of broad-
cast regulation are well-established, 113 the Court nonetheless pains-
takingly reiterated those principles in the instant case. Justice
Brennan, writing for the majority,114 restated the notion that Con-
gress has power under the commerce clause to regulate the use of
the scarce and valuable national resource of the broadcast me-
dium." 5 Congress, in exercising its commerce clause power, may
seek to assure that broadcasters provide the public with "a bal-
anced presentation of information on issues of public impor-
107. Id. at 386.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 388.
110. Id.
111. See 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1982). Section 1252 permits direct appeal to the Su-
preme Court from a judgment that an Act of Congress is unconstitutional. McLucas v.
DeChamplain, 421 U.S. 21, 31 (1975).
112. 104 S. Ct. 3127.
113. Id. at 3116.
114. Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and O'Connor joined Justice Bren-
nan's opinion. Justice White filed a separate dissenting statement. Justice Rehnquist,
Chief Justice Burger, and Justice White joined Justice Rehnquist, who filed a dissent-
ing opinion. Justice Stevens also filed a separate dissenting opinion.
115. 104 S. Ct. at 3116. In a footnote, the Court acknowledged that the rationale
for the spectrum scarcity doctrine has come under increasing attack recently because
cable and satellite television gave communities access to a wide variety of stations. This
abundance of stations may render the scarcity doctrine obsolete. Id. at 3116 n.11.
For a thorough discussion of the possible significance of footnote 11, see infra
notes 169-74 and accompanying text.
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tance."11 6 Broadcasters, however, remain "entitled under the First
Amendment to exercise 'the widest journalistic freedom consistent
with their public [duties]'" because broadcasting is a vital and in-
dependent form of communication. 1 7 The Court restated its posi-
tion that a restriction on broadcaster discretion can be upheld only
when "the restriction is narrowly tailored to further a substantial
government interest.
1 812
In determining whether section 399's restrictions satisfied re-
quirements for permissible broadcast regulation, the Court focused
its analysis on two problems with the ban on editorializing. First,
Congress aimed the ban on editorial opinion specifically at a form
of speech at the heart of first amendment protection. 119 Second,
Congress defined the scope of the ban exclusively on the basis of
content.120 In discussing the first problem, the Court emphatically
reaffirmed its commitment to protecting speech in the form of edi-
torial opinion.121 According to the Court, the editorial plays a spe-
116. 104 S. Ct. at 3116. The Court reaffirmed its position stated in the landmark
case of Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (holding that
newspapers which attack political candidates may not be required to grant them free
reply space without violating first amendment guarantee of free press). While the
Court has never permitted the regulation of print media, the Court has recognized that
"differences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First Amend-
ment standards applied to them." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386
(1969) (upholding the constitutionality of the FCC's fairness doctrine and FCC rules
requiring stations to furnish audio tape, transcript, or broadcast summary and to pro-
vide response time to persons attacked in broadcasts). As support for the Court's con-
tention that it should continue to apply different standards to broadcasters, the Court
cited Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973)
(upholding limited right of access for federal candidates pursuant to § 312(a)(7) of the
Communications Act of 1934) for the proposition that broadcasting frequencies are a
scarce resource. The Court apparently continues to find the spectrum scarcity doctrine
viable notwithstanding increasing attacks from technological experts. For a discussion
of this aspect of the Court's decision, see The Supreme Court, 1983 Term, 98 HARv. L.
REv. 87 (1984).
117. 104 S. Ct. at 3116-17 (citing Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 110 (1973)).
118. 104 S. Ct. at 3118 (citing Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
386 (1969)).
119. 104 S. Ct. at 3118. For the proposition that the preservation of editorial free-
dom and discussion of public issues are foremost concerns of the first amendment, see
NAACP v. Clairborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) ("expression on public
issues has always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy because of First Amend-
ment values" (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1981))); see also Mills v.
Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966) (holding unconstitutional a ban on election day newspa-
per endorsements); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) ("debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open").
120. 104 S. Ct. at 3119.
121. See supra note 119.
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cial role in the discovery and dissemination of political truth.122 In
discussing the second problem, the Court noted that the provision
was a perfect example of a regulation crafted to deny a specific
group the right to address a selected audience on controversial
public issues.123 According to the Court, regulation of speech moti-
vated solely by the desire to suppress expression of a particular
viewpoint on a controversial issue of public interest is the purest
example of a law that abridges the freedom of speech and of the
press. 1
24
The Court rejected the government's assertion that the "spe-
cial circumstances" of noncommercial broadcasters pose hazards so
great that section 399 is necessary to preserve the public's first
amendment interests.125 The Court conceded that the objectives of
preventing governmental or private bias is broadly consistent with
the goals of broadcasting regulation. 26 Unlike the regulations up-
held in previous cases,12 7 however, section 399 leaves no room for
editorial discretion because the provision completely prohibits
broadcasters from speaking out on public issues even in a balanced
and fair manner. The Court acknowledged that the government's
involvement in public broadcasting might pressure traditionally in-
dependent stations into becoming forums devoted solely to
presenting views acceptable to the federal government 128 and that
Congress was aware of these dangers. Accordingly, when funding
local stations Congress sought to preserve the stations' indepen-
dence and community orientations. The Court held, however, that
section 399 simply did not substantially advance the government's
interest in protecting public broadcasters from federal control be-
cause the Public Broadcasting Act already protected local stations
from governmental interference without restricting the stations'
122. 104 S. Ct. at 3119.
123. Id. at 3120.
124. Id. (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530,
546 (1980) (New York Public Service Commission's regulation prohibiting utility com-
panies from placing inserts in monthly bills discussing controversial issues of public
importance held to violate first and fourteenth amendments by directly impinging on
freedom of speech).
125. 104 S. Ct. at 3121.
126. Id. at 3120.
127. Id. at 3121. In Red Lion the Court upheld the fairness doctrine and the
political attack and editorial rules. See 395 U.S. 367 (1969). In Columbia Broadcasting
the Court found that the "public interest" standard does not require broadcasters to
accept editorial advertisements. 412 U.S. at 130.
128. 104 S. Ct. at 3121.
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ability to editorialize on issues of public concern. 29 Moreover, the
Court reviewed the statute's legislative history and found that
Congress added section 399 not because Congress viewed the pro-
vision as vital to preserving "the autonomy and vitality of local
stations but rather 'out of an abundance of caution.'-1o
In addition to its observation that existing statutory safe-
guards and long term appropriations for CPB already insulated lo-
cal stations from government pressure, the Court stated that sec-
tion 399's remedy of suppressing the category of editorial speech
was unlikely to reduce substantially the risk of undue influence or
pressure on local stations by the federal government in the form of
retaliatory cuts in appropriations. 1 ' Because hundreds of local sta-
tions exist throughout the country, the Court expressed its belief
that editorials would "prove to be as distinctive, varied, and idio-
syncratic as the various communities they represent."'3 2 Further-
more, individual broadcasters are likely to aadress editorial opin-
ions to local issues which do not tend to provoke federal
governmental interference because the issues do not have a na-
tional impact.133 The Court noted that the prohibition of editorial
speech by local noncommercial broadcasters overlooked the more
likely risk of the federal government's interference with the more
controversial programs distributed nationally to local stations and
funded by the CPB.13 4 The Court pointed out that the Act does
not attempt to eliminate this greater risk. The Act imposes no
other substantive restrictions on editorial expression except those
of balance and fairness on nationally produced and distributed
public broadcasting programs. 85
The Court also observed that the ban was not "sufficiently tai-
lored to the harms it [sought] to prevent to justify its substantial
129. Id. at 3122. For example, the CPB cannot own or operate stations. 47 U.S.C.
§ 396(g)(3) (1982). The CPB must adhere to "objectivity and balance" in disbursing
funds. 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(1)(A) (1982). The CPB cannot contribute to or support candi-
dates for political office. 47 U.S.C. § 396(f)(3) (1982). No "department, agency, officer,
or employee of the U.S. [may] exercise any direction, supervision, or control over edu-
cational television or radio broadcasters, or over the Corporation or any of its grantees
or subcontractors," 47 U.S.C. § 398(a) (1982). Finally, Congress now makes appropria-
tions of funds for longer terms than year by year. 47 U.S.C. § 396(k)(1)(C) (1982).
130. 104 S. Ct. at 3121.




135. Id. at 3124.
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interference with broadcasters' speech, ' 136 because editorial speech
includes an infinite variety of expression unrelated to governmen-
tal affairs. 13 7 Furthermore, the Court rejected the Justice Depart-
ment's argument that government influence would come from state
and local authorities. 138 According to the Court, the ban applied to
private noncommercial community organizations that indepen-
dently own and operate local stations, and the Act's legislative his-
tory indicated that Congress was concerned only with preventing
federal government influence. 139 The Court also noted that the
government's claimed interest in preventing noncommercial broad-
casters from becoming "privileged outlets" for the expression of
views of owners and managers 140 was dubious.14 ' The Court ex-
plained that the government was making contradictory arguments.
On the one hand, the government contended that despite section
399 broadcasters could disseminate or hide a variety of controver-
sial views through interviewers and the manner in which the
broadcaster reported the news. 42 On the other hand, the govern-
ment argued that section 399 advanced a substantial interest in
keeping stations from airing controversial or partisan opinions.4 3
The Court concluded that the sole effect of section 399 was to pre-
vent a station from communicating views on the station's or its
management's behalf. The prohibitive provision, therefore, did not
merit the sacrifice of first amendment protections for the specula-
tive gain of reducing the risk that stations might serve as outlets
for the expression of unbalanced views. 44
The Court also expressed concern that section 399 did not
serve the public's "paramount right" to be fully informed on mat-
ters of public importance by noncommercial broadcasters because
the statute's effect was to diminish rather than add to the volume
and quality of coverage of controversial issues.'45 Finally, the Court
rejected the argument that section 399's editorial ban represented
136. Id.
137. Id. at 3125. The Court suggested the possibility of broadcasting disclaimers
with every editorial, which would have the virtue of clarifying the responses that might
be made under the fairness doctrine.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 3126 (quoting Brief for Appellant at 34).
141. 104 S. Ct. at 3126.
142. Id.
143. Id.




a valid exercise of Congress' spending power. Justice Brennan care-
fully distinguished Regan v. Taxation With Representation146 by
observing that, unlike the appellee in Taxation With Representa-
tion, stations cannot segregate their activities based on funding
sources 1 7 because section 399 does not allow noncommercial
broadcasters to establish affiliates who could use station facilities
to editorialize with nonfederal monies. The Court did suggest that
a revised statute, which would permit noncommercial broadcasters
to establish affiliate organizations that could then use station facil-
ities to editorialize with nonfederal funds, would be valid. 148
Justice Rehnquist's dissent offered several arguments in sup-
port of section 399's constitutionality. First, Justice Rehnquist ar-
gued that Congress could have chosen to create a federally owned
broadcasting network, but deliberately chose to support autono-
mous noncommercial broadcast facilities and to establish intercon-
nection facilities. 149 Second, Justice Rehnquist offered the simple
argument that "Congress has rationally determined that the bulk
of the taxpayers whose monies provide the funds for grants by the
CPB would prefer not to see the management of local educational
stations promulgate its own private views on the air at taxpayer
expense," and that "[a]ccordingly Congress simply has decided not
to subsidize stations which engage in that activity."'150 Third, Jus-
tice Rehnquist stated that Taxation With Representation clearly
affirmed the idea that Congress need not subsidize the exercise of a
fundamental right, and that the majority flatly avoided the thrust
of the Taxation With Representation holding.' 5' Fourth, Justice
Rehnquist explained that section 399 was indistinguishable from
section 12(a) of the Hatch Act, 52 which the Court upheld in
146. 461 U.S. 540 (1983). In Taxation With Representation the Court held that
pursuant to the spending power, Congress could reasonably refuse to subsidize the lob-
bying activities of tax-exempt charities by not allowing the organizations to use tax
deductible contributions to support lobbying activities. The Court, however, indicated
that the organizations could in some circumstances create affiliates to conduct nonlob-
bying activities using tax deductible contributions while establishing separate affiliates
to undertake lobbying activities without using tax exempt contributions. Id. at 551.
147. 104 S. Ct. at 3128.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 3130 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 3131 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
152. Id. The Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. § 732 (1982), prohibits, inter alia, certain gov-
ernment employees from participating in political campaign management or volunteer
efforts. Justice Brennan noted, however, that it was only in the context of rejecting
Oklahoma's tenth amendment claim that the Court employed the language that Justice
Rehnquist quoted from Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127
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Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Commission.153 Last,
Justice Rehnquist stated that the instant case was "entirely differ-
ent from the so-called 'unconstitutional condition' cases, wherein
the Court stated that the government 'may not deny a benefit to a
person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected in-
terests-especially his interest in freedom of speech.'"""
In his one sentence dissenting statement, Justice White con-
cluded that Congress may award funds conditioned upon ab-
staining from political endorsement and that bans on editorializing
and political endorsement "stand or fall together.'
55
Justice Stevens' dissent focused on the "overriding interest in
forestalling the creation of propaganda organs for the Govern-
ment,"158 a concern which "[o]ne need not have heard the raucous
voice of Adolph Hitler over Radio Berlin to appreciate.' 157 Justice
Stevens concluded that the statute did not preclude broadcasters
from expressing their opinions through other means; that guest
commentators were still free to express opinions; and that the stat-
ute was "neutral in its operation . . . [because] it prohibit[ed] all
editorials without any distinction being drawn concerning the sub-
ject matter or the point of view that might be expressed."' 58 Jus-
tice Stevens believed that Congress enacted the statute to avoid
the risk that speakers would be rewarded or penalized for saying
things that are either appealing or offensive to the sovereign. 59
Justice Stevens was concerned most with keeping government out
of the "propaganda arena."8 0 Stevens believed that section 399
served this purpose because it prevented government from crossing
the line between neutral regulation and subsidization of partisan
opinions.' 8 '
Justice Stevens also distinguished Consolidated Edison Co. v.
Public Service Commission12 by noting that the restriction on
(1947). 104 S. Ct. at 3128 n.27.
153. 330 U.S. 127 (1947) (holding constitutional a part of the Hatch Act that
prohibits any local or state employee who is employed in any activity that receives
funding from the United States from taking part in political activities).
154. 104 S. Ct. at 3132 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Perry v. Sinderman,
408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)).
155. 104 S. Ct. at 3132 (White, J., dissenting).
156. 104 S. Ct. at 3138 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 3133 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 3135 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 3136 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
161. Id.
162. 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
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speech in that case was clearly a viewpoint-based prohibition, un-
like the prohibition achieved under section 399.l es Stevens noted
that the prohibition challenged in League of Women Voters in no
way could be considered "content based" because the prohibition
applied equally to all station owners, and that Congress based the
prohibition not on the offensiveness of the messages but on the
offensiveness of subsidizing speech.
16 4
V. A NEw APPROACH TO FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS OF
BROADCASTERS' RIGHTS?
As described earlier, the federal government has developed an
elaborate system of broadcasting regulations and the Supreme
Court has acknowledged that a certain degree of regulation is an
appropriate means of furthering important first amendment inter-
ests, even though regulating speech represents a diminution of free
expression rights. ' 5 In League of Women Voters the Court struck
down a regulation that directly suppressed free expression, even
though the Court could have upheld the regulation by drawing
upon existing precedent. 68 An obvious question arises whether this
case represents the Court's receptivity to or a recognition of the
need to reconsider the basic premise that broadcasting should be
subject to more regulation than other media. Some commentators
have argued that the Court is not yet embarking on a markedly
different course from the traditional first amendment analysis of
broadcast regulations.1 67 The evident caution that characterizes the
majority opinion of the Court, however, arguably signals the
Court's willingness to reevaluate its first amendment analysis with
regard to broadcasters. In League of Women Voters the Court not
only chose to leave intact its prior decisions, but also clarified the
standard the Court will apply to broadcasters. This further refine-
163. 104 S. Ct. at 3138 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
164. Id.
165. See supra notes 8-25, 49-68 and accompanying text.
166. For a complete discussion of League of Women Voters, see supra notes 97-
164 and accompanying text. For a discussion of earlier precedents, see supra notes 8-25
and accompanying text.
167. See generally Grodisher, The Supreme Court Strikes Down the Public
Broadcasting Editorial Ban, 12 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 699 (1985) (arguing that "League
of Women Voters has the overall impact of reaffirming broadcast regulation and audi-
ence first amendment rights." Id. at 699. The Supreme Court, 1983 Term, 98 HARv. L.
REV. 87, 212 (1984) (arguing that, although the result is unsurprising, the Court's deci-
sion in League of Women Voters is important in that it reveals the Court's degree of
willingness to "adapt constitutional doctrine to the technological and economic condi-
tions that distinguish the modern regulatory state from the ... marketplace of ideas").
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ment indicates that the Court may be ready to reconsider its tradi-
tional analysis of broadcasting regulation.
Three footnotes to the League of Women Voters decision pro-
vide convincing evidence that the Supreme Court, given some
prompting by Congress or the FCC, may revise the traditional ap-
proach to analyzing the constitutionality of broadcast regulation.
Justice Brennan wrote that the distinctive feature of congressional
broadcast regulation has been Congress' effort to ensure that the
FCC grants licenses to use radio and television frequencies only to
those broadcasters who satisfy the "public interest, convenience
and necessity."'" 8 In footnote eleven, however, Justice Brennan "
raises some doubt about the continued validity of regulations
based on the spectrum scarcity doctrine. He points out in the text
of the opinion that spectrum scarcity is the new medium of broad-
cast's primary distinguishing characteristic, which has required
some adjustment in first amendment analysis.17 0 Justice Brennan,
however, notes that the notion that "spectrum scarcity" provides
the prevailing rationale for broadcast regulation has increasingly
come under attack in recent years.' Opponents of the spectrum
scarcity doctrine, including the incumbent Chairman of the FCC,
argue that new technology, such as cable and satellite television,
provides communities with a wide variety of programming alterna-
tives that makes the scarcity doctrine obsolete.17 2 Despite this ar-
gument, Justice Brennan indicated that the Court is unprepared to
abandon its "long-standing" approach, unless Congress or the FCC
sends a signal that technological developments have advanced to
the point of requiring some revision of the system of broadcast reg-
ulation.17 1 In footnote eleven, the Court practically invited Con-
gress and the FCC to demonstrate that the spectrum scarcity doc-
168. 104 S. Ct. at 3116 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1982)).
169. 104 S. Ct. at 3116 n.11. Justice Brennan wrote:
The prevailing rationale for broadcast regulation based on spectrum scarcity has
come under increasing criticism in recent years. Critics, including the incumbent Chair-
man of the FCC, charge that with the advent of cable and satellite television technol-
ogy, communities now have access to such a wide variety of stations that the scarcity
doctrine is obsolete. . . . We are not prepared, however, to reconsider our long-stand-
ing approach without some signal from Congress or the FCC that technological devel-
opments have advanced so far that some revision of the system of broadcast regulation
may be required.
Id. (citation omitted).
170. Id. at 3116.





trine is no longer a valid basis for broadcast regulation. 17 4 The tone
of Justice Brennan's discussion suggests that if Congress or the
FCC takes measures to further loosen the regulatory grip on
broadcast licensees and the licensing procedure, then the Court
will in turn reevaluate its approach to deciding whether restric-
tions on broadcaster expression violate the first amendment.
In another significant footnote, footnote twelve, the Court ob-
served that the fairness doctrine, which imposes another limitation
on broadcasters' first amendment rights, has come under attack re-
cently from the FCC itself.17 5 Justice Brennan noted that the FCC
has suggested that Congress reconsider the continued validity of
the fairness doctrine because the rules, by effectively chilling
speech, do not serve the public interest. 76 Although carefully ad-
ding that the Court was expressing no opinion about the legality of
an FCC decision to either modify or abandon the fairness doctrine,
in his next sentence, however, Justice Brennan restated the recog-
nition in Red Lion that if the FCC showed that "the fairness doc-
trine 'has the effect of reducing rather than enhancing' speech, [the
Court] would then be forced to reconsider the constitutional basis
of [the Red Lion] decision."'71 7 Again, the Court appeared to be
expressing a receptivity to the idea of reevaluating traditional first
amendment analysis of broadcasters' rights. Given a proper case,
the Court may in fact reexamine the validity of restricting broad-
casters' first amendment rights through such means as the fairness
doctrine and the spectrum scarcity doctrine.
The Court's treatment of the FCC v. Pacifica Foundation de-
cision is a further indication of the Court's receptivity to reviewing
its own traditional first amendment analysis of broadcast regula-
tions. Although indecent expression was not at issue in League of
174. See id.
175. Id. at 3117 n.12. Justice Brennan noted:
[T]he FCC, observing that "[ilf any substantial possibility exists that the [fairness doc-
trine] rules have impeded, rather than furthered, First Amendment objectives, repeal
may be warranted on that ground alone," has tentatively concluded that the rules, by
effectively chilling speech, do not serve the public interest, and has therefore proposed
to repeal them.. . . Of course, the Commission may, in the exercise of its discretion,
decide to modify or abandon these rules, and we express no view on the legality of
either course. As we recognized in Red Lion, however, were it to be shown by the Com-
mission that the fairness doctrine 'has the effect of reducing rather than enhancing'







Women Voters, the Court, nevertheless, carefully distinguished the
two cases, noting the differences in the holdings and rationales. In
a footnote, the Court did reaffirm its holding in Pacifica,178 con-
cluding that the FCC may regulate broadcasts containing indecent
language because the governmental interests in reducing the risks
of offending unsuspecting listeners and exposing unsupervised chil-
dren to the indecency outweighed the broadcaster's first amend-
ment rights. 179 The Court distinguished Pacifica, however, because
the regulations examined in League of Women Voters restricted
expression at the core of the first amendment rather than indecent
expression.18 0 In addition, the government in League of Women
Voters made no claim that editorial expression by noncommercial
broadcasters would create a substantial nuisance similar to that in
Pacifica.18' The Court may have both carefully distinguished and
reaffirmed Pacifica because of the Court's future intentions. If the
Court eventually does reject the validity of the fairness doctrine
and the spectrum scarcity doctrine, the Pacifica doctrine would of-
fer the only means whereby the Court could restrict broadcaster
expression, unless the Court somehow could create a new doctrine
to justify different treatment of broadcasters' expression under the
first amendment.
Because the Court raised some questions regarding the contin-
ued validity of the two basic justifications for its analysis of broad-
casters' first amendment rights, and because the decision augments
the dearth of recent case law concerning the extent to which
broadcasters are free to express ideas without governmental re-
straint, League of Women Voters may be one of the most impor-
tant cases in recent years to discuss the first amendment rights of
broadcasters. The case is significant for a host of additional
reasons.
VI. PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF League of Women Voters ON
BROADCASTERS AND THEIR AUDIENCES
Even if League of Women Voters proves not to change signifi-
cantly the Supreme Court's first amendment analysis of restric-
tions on broadcaster expression, the case has several important
practical effects. The most obvious effect of the decision is its
178. 438 U.S. 726 (1978); see supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text for further
discussion of this case.





direct result: noncommercial broadcasters for the first time in
eighteen years are free to editorialize on controversial matters
without the threat of sanction. The extent to which noncommercial
broadcasters choose to exercise their freedom to editorialize re-
mains to be seen, though history indicates that the viewing public
need not be unduly concerned that noncommercial licensees sud-
denly will deluge the airwaves with editorials.182 Even without the
FCC ban, noncommercial broadcasters traditionally have not ex-
pressed editorial opinions to any great extent.
If noncommercial broadcasters do in fact proceed to exercise
their freedom to editorialize, individual viewers and listeners stand
to benefit. As one commentator posits, noncommercial broadcast-
ers are more likely to "present editorials which are more intellectu-
ally satisfying than those .. .half-heartedly presented by com-
mercial broadcasters."183 Unlike commercial broadcasters who may
feel pressure from sponsoring advertisers and A.C Nielsen ratings,
public broadcasters are answerable primarily to their local viewing
and listening public. Accordingly, noncommercial broadcasters
should be less hesitant to address vital community concerns and
problems than commercial licensees.
Another practical effect of the decision is that noncommercial
broadcasters will be more straightforward in their expression of ed-
itorial opinion. After League of Women Voters viewers will be
aware that a particular station message unquestionably constitutes
the view of station management because noncommercial broadcast-
ers will label such broadcasts as editorials. Management may be
182. Some noncommercial broadcasters did editorialize before Congress imposed the
ban despite what a House Report indicated. See H.R. REP. No. 572, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
reprinted in 1967 US. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1799. This report explained that currently
no noncommercial stations broadcast editorials. The committee that wrote the report, how-
ever, had "heard from several witnesses including Secretary of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare John Garner, Ford Foundation President McGeorge Bundy, Utah Governor Calvin L.
Ramster, and State University of New York Chancellor Dr. Samuel B. Gould ... that many
noncommercial stations ... engaged in editorializing on various issues." Lindsey, supra
note 84, at 80 (citing Hearings on H.R. 6746 and S. 1160 Before the House Comm. on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 97, 386, 404, 640 (1967)).
After the FCC effectively disavowed its holding in Mayflower Broadcasting Co., 8 F.C.C.
333 (1940) (barring editorializing by all broadcast licensees), in the report Editorializing by
Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949), years passed before broadcasters editorialized
in significant numbers. As two authors have described, "[t]here was no stampede among
licensees to exercise their newly won freedom." Fang & Whelan, Survey of Television Edito-
rials and Ombudsman Segments, 17 J. BROADCASTING 363 (1973). Fang and Whelan's study
examines editorializing trends among commercial broadcasting licensees based on topics of
editorials, length and number of editorials broadcast, and methods of delivering editorials.
183. Lindsey, supra note 84, at 96.
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less inclined to disguise its views, a tactic made possible under the
FCC's earlier interpretation of section 399,184 by having station
employees deliver their "personal views" on controversial issues. 8 5
The decision to allow editorializing by noncommercial broad-
casters will also provide licensees with a new source of program-
ming material. The addition of editorial presentations can only
have the effect the enriching programming diversity and stimulat-
ing greater public interest and involvement in station affairs-a
desirable result in itself. Because many people view public stations
as the last true source of "localizing," whereby stations reflect the
local community rather than relying on network or syndicated ma-
terial, 18 6 broadcasters who decide to editorialize will inevitably at-
tract attention to, and promote a heightened interest in the sta-
tion. This localization process may have the desirable effect of
increasing the number of viewers and, in turn, the amount of pri-
vate gifts to local stations. On the other hand, the threat exists
that members of the community which particular editorials offend
will withdraw their financial support. But this threat is not unique
to the expression of editorial opinion because the fairness doctrine
dictates that broadcasters currently must present programs dealing
with controversial issues of public importance. Thus, even if a sta-
tion chose not to editorialize, donors could still withdraw financial
support because of displeasure with a station's particular selection
of controversial programming. One possible solution to this prob-
lem would be to earmark more government dollars for public
broadcasting. This solution, however, is unlikely to be employed
because government authorities are increasingly tightening the ap-
propriation of monies. The appropriations for public broadcasting
in recent years clearly attest to this trend.18 7
184. See In re Accuracy In Media, Inc., 45 F.C.C.2d 297, 302 (1973); see also Walker &
Salveter, 32 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 839, 846 (1975) (discussing the legislative history of § 399
and quoting from In re Accuracy In Media).
185. Lindsey, supra note 84, at 86.
186. S. HEAD & C. STERLING, supra note 26, at 253-54.
187. Appropriations for Fiscal Years 1976-1986 are set forth below: (Figures in
thousands of dollars)
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
78,500 103,000 107,150 120,200 152,000
1981 1982 1983 1984* 1985* 1986*
162,000 172,000 137,000 137,500 155,500"* 159,000
*Estimate
** Although Congress appropriated $155.5 million for 1985, the Reagan Administration
sought a $45 million reduction. For 1986 the Administration requested an appropriation of
$75 million. Appendix to the Budget of the United States for Fiscal Year 1984. Because
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Finally, the removal of the ban on editorializing will not result
in management's use of editorials to present propaganda or to mo-
nopolize the airwaves by presenting only the views of management.
Editorials, because they are the most visible expression of station
opinion, are not effective vehicles for propagandizing. 18 s Any man-
agerial propaganda abuse would more likely occur in day-to-day
programming decisions, an area of broadcaster expression not ad-
dressed in League of Women Voters. 89 One example of the more
subtle potential for abuse in daily programming discretion is the
selection of guests for panel discussions. 90 Additionally, once a
station clearly classifies a broadcaster's expression as an editorial,
the fairness doctrine governs19" ' and has the effect of forcing even
noncommercial broadcasters' to provide a reasonable opportunity
for rebuttal. 93 Because the fairness doctrine dictates that manage-
ment give opposition an opportunity to respond to an editorial,
fears that management will monopolize the airwaves to present
only positions favoring the government are not justified. The fair-
ness doctrine's application to noncommercial broadcasters' edito-
rial expressions, by requiring equal presentation of opposing view-
points, unavoidably prevents monopolization of public
broadcasting.
9 4
VII. QUESTIONS LEFT UNANSWERED BY League of Women Voters
One question League of Women Voters leaves unresolved is
under what circumstances, if any, Congress may threaten noncom-
mercial broadcasters with loss of their tax-exempt status for engag-
ing in extensive "lobbying activities." As the Court noted in Regan
Congress authorizes appropriations for the CPB two years in advance, the Administration
made requests for cuts in 1985 and 1986 in the 1984 budget.
According to the Appendix to the Budget of the United States for Fiscal Year 1985,
Congress appropriated $159.5 million for 1986, and the Administration sought a $20 million
reduction in funding levels. This attempt "underscore[s] the importance of encouraging user
and private support for the public broadcasting industry, allowing for the continued reduc-
tion of Federal support." Appendix to the Budget of the United States for Fiscal Year 1985.
Budget appropriations for the last three years and projected outlays for 1986 are below
the high water mark funding level set in 1982, although Congress gradually has increased
appropriations for the CPB since the drastic cuts in 1983.
188. See Note, supra note 96, at 561.
189. Id. at 561-62.
190. Id.
191. See 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1982). The Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality
of this provision in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
192. See 47 U.S.C. § 398(1) (1982).
193. Id.
194. See Lindsey, supra note 84, at 88.
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v. Taxation With Representation,95 Congress can, in the exercise
of its spending power refuse to subsidize lobbying acitivities of tax-
exempt charitable organizations by refusing to allow such organiza-
tions to use tax deductible gifts to conduct lobbying activities.9'9 In
Taxation With Representation the Court observed that under sec-
tion 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code 97 certain organiza-
tions could create affiliates to conduct nonlobbying activities using
the tax deductible monies and establish separate affiliates under
section 501(c)(4) to pursue lobbying efforts without such
restrictions.
98
The problem in applying sections 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) to
noncommercial broadcasters is threefold. First, no clear standards
exist for determining in what circumstances Congress could con-
strue an editorial as a lobbying activity. Obviously, on-air pleas for
viewers and listeners to urge Congress or state governments to ap-
propriate more money for public broadcasting would constitute
lobbying efforts. Other editorials, however, may be harder to clas-
sify. Second, Congress has decided to impose penalties on tax-ex-
empt organizations that attempt to influence legislation. 99 The
195. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
196. Id. at 550.
197. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982).
198. 461 U.S. at 544; see also 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4) (1982).
199. See 26 U.S.C. § 4911 (1982). The Code states the following concerning "influenc-
ing legislation:"
(d)(1) GENERAL RULE.-Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2), for purposes of
this section, the term "influencing legislation" means-
(A) any attempt to influence any legislation through an attempt to affect the opin-
ions of the general public or any segment thereof, and
(B) any attempt to influence any legislation through communciation with any
member or employee of a legislative body, or with any government official or employee
who may participate in the formulation of the legislation.
(2) EXCEPriONs.-For purposes of this section, the term "influencing legislation", with
respect to an organization, does not include-
(A) making available the results of nonpartisan analysis, study, or research;
(B) providing of technical advice or assistance (where such advice would otherwise
constitute the influencing of legislation) to a governmental body or to a committee or
other subdivision thereof in response to a written request by such body or subdivision,
as the case may be;
(C) appearances before, or communications to, any legislative body with respect to
a possible decision of such body which might affect the existence of the organization,
its powers and duties, tax-exempt status, or the deduction of contributions to the
organization;
(D) communications between the organization and its bona fide members with re-
spect to legislation or proposed legislation of direct interest to the organization and
such members, other than communications described in paragraph (3); and
(E) any communication with a government official or employee, other than-
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Code sections define legislation quite broadly, 00 giving Congress
the freedom to label almost any editorial statement directed at lo-
cal community issues as an attempt to influence legislation. This
predicament could endanger the tax-exempt status of most non-
commercial broadcasters. Third, and most importantly, the oppor-
tunity under section 501(c)(4) to establish a separate lobbying affil-
iate may not be a viable option for noncommercial broadcasters.
The whole purpose of allowing editorials is to facilitate the unim-
peded flow of discussion concerning matters of local and national
concern. Broadcasters can communicate editorials only through
station facilities. Thus, unless an explicit exception is made for
public broadcasters, who cannot create affiliates to do their editori-
alizing, the Court may have conferred a meaningless right upon
broadcasters.
A second question left unresolved by League of Women Vot-
ers is whether its analysis applies equally to section 399's ban on
political endorsements. In the instant case the Court did not ad-
dress the constitutionality of the ban on political endorsements
contained in section 399. Nonetheless, one of the greatest effects of
the decision in the instant case is that the analysis used by the
Court to invalidate the portion of the statute in question in League
of Women Voters, if applied to the ban on political endorsements,
will inevitably result in the demise of the political endorsement
prohibition. Perhaps the only bar to the complete invalidation of
section 399 is that the Court has not yet heard a case challenging
the constitutionality of the ban on political endorsements; the ap-
pellees in League of Women Voters dropped their original chal-
lenge to the ban on political endorsements in the course of the
litigation.
2 0 1
The question of whether the government should prevent non-
commercial broadcasters from endorsing or opposing political can-
(i) a communication with a member or employee of a legislative body (where such
communication would otherwise constitute the influencing of legislation), or
(ii) a communication the principal purpose of which is to influence legislation.
26 U.S.C. § 4911 (d)(1), (2).
200. Congress has defined "legislation" to include "action with respect to Acts, bills,
resolutions, or similar items by the Congress, any State legislature, any local council, or
similar governing body, or by the public in a referendum, initiative, constitutional amend-
ment, or similar procedure." Id. § 4911(e)(2).
201. League of Women Voters v. FCC, 547 F. Supp. 379 (C.D. Cal. 1982). On October
2, 1981, plaintiffs made an important alteration in the scope of litigation by dropping their
challenge to § 399's prohibition of public broadcasters' supporting or opposing political can-
didates. Id. at 382.
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didates undoubtedly will excite more public debate than did the
question of whether the government should have prevented non-
commercial broadcasters from editorializing. The Supreme Court,
however, could decide the issue with relative ease. In League of
Women Voters two Justices who upheld the constitutionality of
the editorial prohibition clearly indicated that if presented with a
ripe controversy, they would uphold the political endorsement ban
as well. 02 However, the majority's analysis in League of Women
Voters, if followed, virtually mandates a ruling that section 399's
political endorsement ban must fall as well. As with the ban on
editorializing, the Act has defined the prohibition against political
endorsements exclusively in terms of the content of the suppressed
speech. In addition, like the ban on editorializing, the ban on polit-
ical endorsements is a regulation aimed at denying a specific group
the right to address selected audiences on controversial issues of
public importance. The Court held in League of Women Voters
that this type of ban is "the purest example of a 'law. . .abridg-
ing the freedom of speech, or of the press.' "203 In a case involving
the political endorsement ban, however, the Court could reach the
tortured conclusion that the ban protects broadcasters from politi-
cal pressures. The Court found this argument to be inadequate
with regard to prohibiting editorials. The differences between edi-
torializing and endorsing a political candidate do not seem suffi-
cient to justify a finding that a ban on political endorsements is
necessary to protect broadcasters from governmental pressures.
Both editorials and political endorsements are expressions of opin-
ion on issues of public debate. Concededly, expression of opinion
about a politician may attract more governmental interest and,
therefore, more governmental pressure than expression of opinion
about a local issue. The two fatal aspects of the editorializing
ban-its content-based classification and its denial of a specific
group's right to address controversial public issues-would seem,
however, to dictate rejection of the political endorsement ban as
well. The same statutory safeguards that the Court found would
avoid the asserted risks of government intervention in the editorial
context also govern political endorsements.
202. Justice White's dissenting statement indicated that he would uphold the consti-
tutionality of the political endorsement ban because he believed that Congress could condi-
tion a grant of funds on abstention from political endorsements by broadcasters. 104 S. Ct.
at 3132. Justice Rehnquist expressed the same view in his dissenting opinion. Id.
203. 104 S. Ct. at 3120 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447




The decision in League of Women Voters will be hailed as a
great victory by some and a political Pandora's box by others.
League of Women Voters arguably represents an indication by the
Court that it is ready to revise its traditional first amendment
analysis of broadcast regulations. Three footnotes indicate that,
given the proper case, the Court may reject the validity of estab-
lished doctrines, such as the fairness and spectrum scarcity doc-
trines, and uphold regulation of only limited types of broadcaster
expression, such as indecent speech.04 Even if the decision proves
not to be the beginning of major change in broadcast analysis, the
decision certainly continues the clear trend toward loosening the
regulations imposed uniquely on public broadcasters. Thus, this
decision represents a small step towards achievement of greater
equality between the first amendment protections for broadcasting
and other media.
205
League of Women Voters will have several practical effects.
First, noncommercial broadcasters will be free for the first time in
eighteen years to editorialize. This freedom, if exercised, should
present listeners with more direct and more intellectually satisfy-
ing editorials than those currently presented by commercial broad-
casters. Second, noncommercial broadcasters will be more straight-
forward in openly labeling an expression of opinion as an editorial.
The need no longer exists for stations to disguise their views to
avoid the prohibition of section 399. Third, the additional source
of programming material in the form of editorial expression will
enrich program diversity and stimulate greater diversity and local
interest in and contributions to local broadcasters.
The decision in League of Women Voters leaves unresolved
two questions that may prompt action by Congress and litigants.
The possibility, after this decision, that Congress may find public
broadcasters in violation of laws proscribing the excessive use of
tax deductible contributions for financing lobbying activities
should prompt Congress to clarify what constitutes lobbying activi-
ties in the context of noncommercial broadcasting. Additionally,
the decision provides support for a challenge to the constitutional-
ity of the ban on political endorsements contained in section 399.
Finally, if broadcasters choose to exercise their constitutionally
protected editorial freedom affirmed in League of Women Voters,
204. See supra notes 168-81 and accompanying text.
205. See The Supreme Court, 1983 Term, 98 HRv. L. REv. 87, 206-07 (1984).
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perhaps public broadcasting will move a step closer to the goal de-
scribed by essayist E.B. White that public broadcasting should "re-
state and clarify the social dilemma and the political pickle.
'20 6
L. ALLYN DIXON, JR.
206. Lindsey, supra note 84, at 63 (quoting Letter from NEw YORKER magazine essay-
ist E.B. White to the Carnegie Commission, reprinted in CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON EDUCA-
TIONAL TELEviSION: A PROGRAM FOR ACTION at 13 (1967)).
